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Abstract—This paper establishes the tractability of finding the
optimal Nash equilibrium, as well as the optimal social solution,
to a discrete congestion game using a gate-model quantum
computer. The game is of the type originally posited by Rosenthal
in the 1970’s. To find the optimal Nash equilibrium, we formulate
an optimization problem encoding based on potential functions
and path selection constraints, and solve it using the Quantum
Alternating Operator Ansatz. We compare this formulation to its
predecessor, the Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm.
We implement our solution on an idealized simulator of a gate-
model quantum computer, and demonstrate tractability on a
small two-player game. This work provides the basis for future
endeavors to apply quantum approximate optimization to quan-
tum machine learning problems, such as the efficient training of
generative adversarial networks using potential functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Gate-model Noisy, Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) [1]
computers are becoming increasingly available in the cloud,
and of sufficient scale and fidelity to run interesting quantum
algorithms. Quantum algorithms such as the Quantum Ap-
proximate Optimization Algorithm of [2] and the Quantum
Alternating Operator Ansatz of [3], collectively QAOA, are
able to execute on NISQ hardware and provide the potential
of advantage at larger scales. Mapping of industry applications
onto quantum algorithms has begun, with particular interest in
how hybrid classical-quantum techniques might assist machine
learning applications across sectors [4].
In this paper we have brought together machine learning
practitioners, financial quantitative analysts and quantum soft-
ware technologists to investigate how quantum approximate
optimization might assist training a generative adversarial
network (GAN). Financial services organizations are exploring
GANs as a means to generate synthetic data [5], allowing
machine learning models to be developed without risking real
customer data. GANs are also being trained to identify fraud
[6], using techniques that may extend to the prediction of net-
work infrastructure issues. Trading [7] and risk management
strategies [8] are also being learned using GANs, leveraging
their expected robustness to changes in market environment.
One challenge facing GAN users is that current gradient-
descent methods can fail to converge to the optimal Nash
equilibrium in the zero-sum training game. This results in a
less accurate model. The challenge is increased in situations
where the model includes discrete decision or categorical
variables, for which gradients must be synthesized, and where
the model presents a highly multi-modal behavior, for which
mode collapse becomes an issue [9].
In considering how quantum computing might provide a
solution to the challenge of training a GAN, we return to dis-
crete neural network models previously considered intractable
classically. We lay the groundwork for a new approach by
first implementing and experimentally testing methods for
calculating the optimal Nash equilibrium and the optimal
social solution for a discrete congestion game [10] using
QAOA. We describe the relevance of this application to the
broader goals of quantum machine learning, its formulation
in both QAOA variants, experimental results, lessons learned,
and avenues for further development.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We summarize quantum algorithms and identities upon
which this research is based.
A. Binary to spin system identity
Conversion from a binary system based on x ∈ {0, 1} to a
spin system based on s ∈ {−1,+1} is afforded by substitution
using the identity
s = 2x− 1 (1)
B. Penalty functions for soft constraints
A real-valued (x ∈ RN , c ∈ R) equality constraint of the
form
f(x) = c
can be converted to a form that can be solved by uncon-
strained optimization using a penalty function as
P (x) = A (f(x)− c)2 (2)
where
• P (x) = 0 when the constraint is met
• P (x) > 0 when the constraint is violated
• A ∈ R | A > 0 is a penalty scaling coefficient
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C. Quantum approximate optimization
The Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm [2] has
been extended [11] to minimize a polynomial cost function
with real-valued coefficients and discrete solution variables.
Discrete solution variables can be defined as a binary system
x ∈ {0, 1}N or spin system s ∈ {−1,+1}N of N variables.
In its canonical form, QAOA’s polynomial cost function is a
sum-of-products expression with each product term interacting
between 0 and N of the solution variables. If we consider each
possible unique interaction then, using the binomial theorem,
the maximum number of terms is 2N . We observe that the
total number of non-zero polynomial coefficients in a tractable
problem formulation must scale favorably with respect to the
problem size, as each coefficient must be calculated during
pre-processing and input as a parameter to the QAOA circuit.
Many interesting optimization problems have at most
quadratic terms in the polynomial cost function [12]. We
restrict ourselves to quadratic problems formulated as a spin
system. This results in the Ising model optimization cost
function familiar to quantum annealing, as
C(s) = c+
N∑
i=1
hisi +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
Jijsisj (3)
where
• c ∈ R is a constant term
• hi ∈ R is a coefficient of the bias vector h
• Jij ∈ R is a coefficient of the upper-triangular coupling
matrix J
The execution of QAOA is as a variational algorithm where
circuit parameters β ∈ [0, pi]p and γ ∈ [0, 2pi]p are varied to
minimize the expectation value 〈ψ1|C|ψ1〉, and so measure
“good” solutions with high probability where
|ψ0〉 = |+〉⊗N (4)
is the initial state of the system, and
|ψ1〉 =
(
1∏
α=p
U(B, βα)U(C, γα)
)
|ψ0〉 (5)
is the final state of the system.
In Eq. (5), unitary evolution occurs via two exponentiated
operators: U(B, βα) = e−iβαB and U(C, γα) = e−iγαC , with
i =
√−1 being the imaginary number. The gates applied
in a quantum computer iterate as α = 1, · · · , p due to the
right-associativity of these operations. Parameter p ∈ N is the
number of parameterized repetitions in the resulting quantum
circuit, and relates linearly to its depth. The quantum circuit
hyper-parameter space of β and γ also increases linearly with
p, and is optimized classically.
For our case of the Ising model cost function in Eq. (3), the
cost operator is defined in the Pauli-Z basis (σz) as
C =
N∑
i=1
hiσ
z
i +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
Jijσ
z
i σ
z
j (6)
and is not unitary but is Hermitian, allowing it to be used
as the expectation value observable.
For unconstrained optimization problems, the Quantum Ap-
proximate Optimization Algorithm defines a mixing operator
that explores all 2N combinatorial solutions. It is defined in
the Pauli-X basis (σx) [2, Equation (3)] in a way physically
similar to quantum annealing, as
B =
N∑
i=1
σxi (7)
For constrained optimization problems, the Quantum Alter-
nating Operator Ansatz suggests B be designed to constrain
the feasible subspace of solutions. One example of this is
a parity mixer, which uses alternating application of XY
mixers to odd and even spin subsets [3, Equations (7)-(9)],
we summarize as
U(B, βα) = U(Blast, βα)U(Beven, βα)U(Bodd, βα) (8)
with
Bodd =
N−1∑
a odd
σxaσ
x
a+1 + σ
y
aσ
y
a+1
Beven =
N∑
a even
σxaσ
x
a+1 + σ
y
aσ
y
a+1
Blast =
{ σxNσx1 + σyNσy1 , N odd
I, N even
and where I is the identity transform and all arithmetic is
modulo N .
Such a mixer can, for example, be used to realize one-
hot encoding of categorical variables and has the potential to
improve application performance over the original QAOA.
III. CONGESTION GAME APPLICATION
A congestion game is a class of game-theoretic problem
involving players, resources, and a utility function that depends
on the number of players sharing each resource – the conges-
tion. A congestion game is a specialization of a potential game,
and it is the use of potential functions that will form the basis
of our formulation.
A. Previous work
The congestion game was originally introduced in [10], and
is a type of game that is guaranteed to possess at least one pure
Nash equilibrium. [13] showed that finding a Nash equilibrium
in an asymmetric network congestion game with linear delay
functions is PLS-complete, and finding the social optimum
is NP-hard. [14] showed that finding a Nash equilibrium in
a congestion game is PLS-complete in general, even for two
players, which is exponential in the worst case to solve. How-
ever, such solutions may not be the optimal Nash equilibrium,
being the Nash equilibrium with the lowest combined delay
for all players. [15] proved the global minimum to a symmetric
congestion game is the socially optimal Nash equilibrium.
[16], [17] showed that finding a Nash equilibrium with the
maximum utility for even a single player in a two-player game
is NP-hard. [18] confirmed some of these complexity results,
and provided some small-scale network games that were useful
in early development.
Our choice to focus on the use of potential functions is
informed by recent developments [19], in which a method for
training a GAN is proposed that yields a single optimal Nash
equilibrium by using potential functions. Another method in
[19] considers training a GAN explicitly as a game with
mixed strategies, and is shown to avoid mode collapse. [20]
is the seminal reference for generative adversarial networks,
and identifies training a GAN to be a zero-sum game that
results in a Nash equilibrium. [21] extended [10] to show that
congestion games and potential games are equivalent.
Quantum adversarial approaches to machine learning have
started to be developed by the quantum computing research
community. [4] identifies finding the Nash equilibrium of
a game as one of a class of industry-relevant applications
that could benefit from quantum-assisted machine learning
(QAML). [22] introduces quantum generative adversarial net-
works (QuGANs) and concludes that quantum adversarial
networks may exhibit an exponential advantage over classical
adversarial networks, when the data, the generator and the
discriminator are all quantum. [23] constructs a GAN using
quantum circuits, and shows a technique for computing gra-
dients used during learning. [24] derives an adversarial algo-
rithm to approximate quantum pure states, and uses resilient
back-propagation to overcome the small observed gradients
to improve the optimization of generator and discriminator
networks.
B. Contribution
Our contribution in this work is the experimental evaluation
of the tractability of finding the optimal Nash equilibrium
in a discrete asymmetric-network congestion game. We im-
plement this game using QAOA on a simulator of a gate-
model quantum computer. We design and implement a soft-
constraint formulation based on [2], and compare it to a hard-
constraint formulation based on [3]. We choose an idealized
simulator of a gate-model quantum computer [25] as a first
step in understanding algorithm and application performance,
and with the intent of evaluating on NISQ computers in the
future [26]. To our knowledge, no work using QAOA or other
QAML techniques to calculate the optimal Nash equilibrium
in a game has been published.
C. Relevance
Generative adversarial networks can be trained and used
for purposes including classification, where the discriminator
network is the product of interest, or for synthetic data gener-
ation, where the generator network is the product of interest.
Applications for GAN-based machine learning in financial
services include synthetic data generation [5], market risk
management [8], risk factor analysis [27], trading strategies
[7], and detecting fraud and other anomalies [6]. Numerous
applications of GAN-based machine learning exist in other
sectors.
The optimal Nash equilibrium is an important concept
in training a GAN. A GAN involves two neural networks
competing against each other. The discriminator network tries
to accurately discriminate features in observed data. The gen-
erator network tries to generate statistically indistinguishable
data to fool the discriminator. In this competition the training
outcome is hampered if the two networks settle into a sub-
optimal Nash equilibrium. This reduces the accuracy of the
resulting discriminator, and of the synthetic data produced by
the generator.
The Nash equilibrium also finds utility in game-theoretic
modeling of human behaviors in traffic and other resource
management activities where players act in their own self-
interest, but without knowledge of the others’ strategies.
Understanding what is the optimal solution if players work
cooperatively, compared to the optimal competitive Nash equi-
librium, provides an indication of how well designed the rules
of the game and topology of the network are to achieve a
socially desirable outcome.
IV. CONGESTION GAME FORMULATION
The canonical definition of a congestion game is as a tuple
(N ,R,S, d), where
• N = {1, · · · , n} is the set of n players
• R = {1, · · · , r} is the set of r resources
• S = S1×· · ·×Sn is the strategy space of the game, where
Si ⊆ 2R \∅ is the strategy space1 for player i ∈ N
• d = (d1, · · · , dr) models the congestion, where dk : N 7→
R is the delay function for using resource k ∈ R
For a specific application, this definition must be specialized
to the subset of resources available to each player. For a traffic
congestion game each player is given an origin and destination,
and is limited in their path by the topology of the network.
In this paper we approach a two-player asymmetric network
congestion game. This is representative of two players trav-
eling on a road network with different origins or destination
locations, and can be NP-hard to calculate both the optimal
Nash equilibrium [16], and the optimal social solution [13].
Excluded from this paper is a theoretical treatment of the
computational complexity of this specific case. However we
do analyze the limiting behavior of the QAOA cost functions
as an initial indicator of tractability at scale, the details of
which are presented in Section VII.
A solution to a congestion game is a set of actions selected
by all players
A = {A1, · · · ,An} (9)
Each player’s action can be described as the set of resources
utilized in the network
1The strategy space uses the power set notation 2R, which describes every
possible combination of choosing, or not choosing, to use a resource.
Ai ⊆ R, i ∈ N (10)
and results in a utility for that player that is the combined
delay across the resources utilized2
ui(A) =
∑
k∈Ai
dk(nk(A)) (11)
where the delay for each resource depends on the number
of players utilizing it
nk(A) = |{i ∈ N | k ∈ Ai}| (12)
The combined utility for all players is then
u(A) =
∑
i∈N
ui(A) (13)
From this we can define the optimal social solution as
Asocial = argmin
A∈S
u(A)
which minimizes the combined delay for all players, and
can be written more explicitly as
Asocial = argmin
A∈S
∑
k∈R
nk(A)dk(nk(A)) (14)
Using the potential function approach of [21, Eq. (3.2)] we
can define the optimal Nash equilibrium as
ANash = argmin
A∈S
∑
k∈R
nk(A)∑
j
dk(j) (15)
which is the socially optimal Nash equilibrium since any
change to the solution incurs a change in optimization value
that is equal to the change in utility for each affected player.
This is confirmed by [15] where the same formulation as
Eq. (15) was used as part of analysis of symmetric congestion
games.
A. Path model of player strategy space
In network congestion games the strategy space for a player
to utilize resources is constrained by the network topology.
In a traffic congestion game the set of paths that a player
might utilize to travel from source to destination can be
considered to be small and fixed, based on that player’s
own knowledge of the road network, augmented by consumer
navigation applications. In designing the model that represents
a player’s use of network resources, the naïve approach of
an independent binary decision variable for each player and
each resource is inefficient because it requires O(nr) variables
with a very large number of constraints. We therefore assume
a path-finding algorithm exists that can provide a small and
fixed number of available paths for each player, and we design
the player’s strategy space based on these alternatives.
2In the model of a traffic congestion game a player’s utility is their total
travel time, and the objective of the game is to minimize this.
We define the existing path-finding function fpath as
fpath : {N , 2R} → {True,False}
and then define the available player strategies as exactly the
subset that were suggested by the path-finding function as
Si = {Ai ∈ 2R | fpath(i,Ai)}, i ∈ N (16)
B. Linear model of resource congestion
In network congestion games each resource delay function
dk is an arbitrary non-decreasing function that maps the
number of players sharing a resource onto the delay that
each player incurs in using the resource. However, arbitrary
functions can be expensive to represent using polynomial cost
functions available to the quantum approximate optimization
techniques of Section II-C. We therefore restrict our formula-
tion to linear resource delay functions, which does not reduce
the complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium in the analysis
of [13].
We define each resource delay function dk as a linear
function
dk(x) = ak + bkx, x ∈ N, k ∈ R (17)
where ak ∈ R and bk ∈ R are fixed resource delay
coefficients, and x is the number of players utilizing the
resource.
C. Player strategy space encoding
We encode each player’s strategy space from Eq. (16) using
binary decision variables zi,j that denote whether player i
chooses path j, and build the binary solution vector
z = {zi,j | i ∈ N , j ∈ Si}, zi,j ∈ {0, 1} (18)
which using Eq. (1) can be converted to the spin-system
solution vector
s = {si,j | i ∈ N , j ∈ Si}, si,j ∈ {−1,+1} (19)
Each player may only choose a single path. This is enforced
using linear constraints∑
j∈Si
zi,j = 1, ∀i ∈ N (20)
or equivalently by Eq. (1) as∑
j∈Si
si,j = 2− |Si|, ∀i ∈ N (21)
By meeting this constraint, each player’s action is defined
as the single strategy selected by the solution
Ai = j ∈ Si 3 zi,j = 1, i ∈ N (22)
and so the solution to the game A is encoded in z.
D. Player utility function encoding
We can calculate the number of players using a resource
k ∈ R from Eq. (12) by summing the players whose chosen
paths in Eq. (18) include that resource
nk(z) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Si|k∈j
zi,j (23)
or, equivalently by Eq. (1) as
nk(s) =
1
2
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Si|k∈j
(1 + si,j) (24)
From this, we can now calculate the delay for a resource
k ∈ R by substitution into Eq. (17), as
dk(nk(s)) = ak +
bk
2
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Si|k∈j
(1 + si,j)
 (25)
The utility for a player who has selected their action as in
Eq. (22) can now be calculated from Eq. (11) as
ui(s) =
∑
k∈Ai
ak + bk
2
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Si|k∈j
(1 + si,j)
 (26)
E. Path constraint (soft constraint form)
The path selection constraint of Eq. (21) can be converted
to a penalty function using Eq. (2) as
Cpath(s) = A
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Si
si,j + |Si| − 2
2 (27)
which is a summation of the n independent player path
constraints, where the penalty scaling coefficient A ∈ R is to
be determined experimentally.
This penalty function contains at most O(np2) quadratic
terms, where p denotes the number of paths available to each
player. Refer to the analysis in Section VII-C for details.
F. Path constraint (hard constraint form)
The path selection constraint of Eq. (21) can be realized
using n parity ring mixers [3] acting independently on each
player’s path selection decision variables. Each parity mixer is
configured to preserve a Hamming weight of 1 by initialization
of the state space into the solution where each player selects
the first path option. An illustration of this configuration for a
three-player game is provided in Fig. 1.
G. Finding the optimal social solution
The objective of finding the optimal social solution in
Eq. (14) can now be written as a minimization objective over
the solution vector s, as
ssocial = argmin
s
Csocial(s) (28)
Fig. 1: Initial configuration for the hard constraint form of the path selection
constraint in a three-player game. The three players have 5, 7 and 4 options,
respectively.
where
Csocial(s) =
∑
k∈R
nk(s) dk(nk(s)) (29)
and where the components of the optimization are defined
by Eq. (24) and Eq. (25).
This cost function contains at most quadratic terms and can
be expanded for a specific network topology. The number of
quadratic terms is O(rn2p2) in the worst case. Refer to the
analysis in Section VII-A for details.
H. Finding the optimal Nash equilibrium
The objective of finding the optimal Nash equilibrium in
Eq. (15) can also be written as a minimization objective over
the solution vector s, as
sNash = argmin
s
CNash(s) (30)
where
CNash(s) =
∑
k∈R
nk(s)∑
j
dk(j) (31)
and where the components of the optimization are defined
by Eq. (24) and Eq. (17).
This expression contains an inner sum whose number of
terms depends on the solution. This form is not programmable
on a quantum computer, where it must be possible to calculate
the coefficients of the cost function polynomial of Eq. (6) and
build the quantum circuit. However, the summation over nk(s)
is shown in Section VII-B to reduce to a triangular number
Tn =
n∑
k=1
k = 1 + 2 + 3 + · · ·+ n = n(n+ 1)
2
and generates the form
CNash(s) =
∑
k∈R
((
ak +
bk
2
)
nk(s) +
bk
2
nk(s)
2
)
(32)
This cost function contains at most quadratic terms and can
now be expanded for a specific network topology. The number
of quadratic terms is O(rn2p2) in the worst case. Refer to the
analysis in Section VII-B for details.
I. Soft constraint formulation using the Quantum Approximate
Optimization Algorithm
The congestion game application can be realized using an
unconstrained optimization approach by combining either the
optimal social cost function (Eq. (29)) or the optimal Nash
equilibrium cost function (Eq. (32)) with the path selection
penalty function (Eq. (27)), as
Csoftsocial(s) = Csocial(s) + Cpath(s) (33)
and
CsoftNash(s) = CNash(s) + Cpath(s) (34)
Solving this formulation using the Quantum Approximate
Optimization Algorithm involves its execution as described in
Section II-C. The QAOA cost operator is of the Eq. (6) form,
generated by substitution of the Pauli-Z operator σzi for each
spin si ∈ s in Eq. (33) and Eq. (34). The QAOA unconstrained
mixing operator is of the standard Eq. (7) form.
J. Hard constraint formulation using the Quantum Alternating
Operator Ansatz
The congestion game application can also be realized using
a constrained optimization approach by using only the optimal
social cost function (Eq. (29)) or the optimal Nash equilibrium
cost function (Eq. (32)), as
Chardsocial(s) = Csocial(s) (35)
and
ChardNash(s) = CNash(s) (36)
and whose path selection constraint is realized as described
in Section IV-F.
Solving this formulation using the Quantum Alternating
Operator Ansatz involves its execution as described in Sec-
tion II-C. The QAOA cost operator remains of the Eq. (6)
form, generated by substitution of the Pauli-Z operator σzi for
each spin si ∈ s in Eq. (35) and Eq. (36). The n constrained
mixing operators are of the Eq. (8) form, with each mixer
i ∈ N applying to the set of spin variables {si,j | j ∈ Si},
and the initial feasible state being |1〉.
V. CONGESTION GAME EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We execute the congestion game formulation upon an ideal-
ized simulator of a gate-model quantum computer to assess its
tractability prior to execution on NISQ hardware [25]. We do
this in a sequence of steps designed to verify the application
is implemented correctly.
Fig. 2: The asymmetric network game used for the experiments. In this game,
player A starts at node S1 and travels to node T , while player B starts at
node S2 and travels to node T . The edge from node X to Y has a delay that
is a function of the number of players using the resource, nr .
A. Experimental data
The input data for this experiment is a small asymmetric
network congestion game with two players and seven nodes,
illustrated in Fig. 2. This game was designed such that the
combined utility of all players for the optimal social solution
was different than that of the optimal Nash equilibrium.
For this game, the path-finding function was deemed to
return all possible paths that honor the directed edges in the
graph. By inspection, it can be deduced that player A has four
available paths, while player B has two.
B. Calculation of penalty scaling
A simple method to calculate penalty scaling coefficient A
in Eq. (27) was adopted, as
A > max [C(s)]−min [C(s)] (37)
where C(s) = Csocial(s) is the unconstrained part of Eq. (33)
for finding the optimal social solution, and C(s) = CNash(s)
is the unconstrained part of Eq. (34) for finding the optimal
Nash equilibrium. This ensures that the value of C(s) for any
infeasible solution is greater than the energy for all feasible
solutions. The performance of this setting for realizing feasible
solutions will be validated experimentally.
C. Investigation of the solution space
We implemented the optimal social solution cost function
Csocial(s) and optimal Nash equilibrium cost function CNash(s)
and evaluated them by brute force. Following the formulation
of Section IV, a system involving only 6 spin variables is
realized, making this type of analysis possible. This generates
a solution space of 64 binary solution vectors, of which only 8
meet the path selection constraint of Eq. (21). The 8 feasible
solutions represent the product of independent decisions of
player A choosing 1 from 4 paths, and player B choosing 1
from 2 paths.
S1 UA
X
S2
B
Y
T
VA
A  
B B
Fig. 3: Brute force optimal social solution for the asymmetric network game.
S1 U
X
A
S2
B
Y
T
V
A,B A,B
Fig. 4: Brute force optimal Nash equilibrium for the asymmetric network
game.
Fig. 3 depicts the optimal social solution, while Fig. 4
depicts the optimal Nash equilibrium calculated by brute force.
The optimal social solution had a combined utility of 2.05, and
involved no common paths. The optimal social solution is not
a Nash equilibrium because player A, who has a delay of 1.4
(S1−U−V −T ), has the option of choosing an alternate route
that would incur a smaller delay of 1.3 (S1 − X − Y − T ).
However, if player A were to do this, then player B’s delay
would increase by more than the benefit to player A. This
change results in the optimal Nash equilibrium, which has a
combined utility of 2.2.
D. Investigation of a single QAOA circuit
Before enabling the outer classical optimization loop of
QAOA, we first investigated the behavior for a single iteration
of the Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm circuit
on formulation Eq. (34) for the optimal Nash equilibrium.
The penalty scaling coefficient is calculated using Eq. (37)
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Fig. 5: 〈ψ1|CNash(s)|ψ1〉 for the asymmetric network game, using the
Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm with A = 10, p = 1.
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Fig. 6: 〈ψ1|CNash(s)|ψ1〉 for the asymmetric network game, using the
Quantum Alternating Operator Ansatz with p = 1 and no initial mixing.
as A = 10. We vary β and γ angles for a p = 1 execution
of Eq. (5), and obtain the results in Fig. 5. This figure shows
good mixing in the quantum state space, indicating the scale
of the cost function data is acceptable.
We also investigated the behavior for a single iteration of the
Quantum Alternating Operator Ansatz circuit on formulation
Eq. (36) for the optimal Nash equilibrium. As designed in
Fig. 1 the qubit registers holding the decision spaces for player
A and player B were initialized into the |1〉 state, and in
accordance with the normal flow of the QAOA algorithm
applied the cost function gates before the mixing operator
gates. The γ vs. β heat-map that resulted is shown in Fig. 6,
and has no variation across the γ axis. This is consistent with
the fact that the z-rotations caused by the cost operator gates
have no effect on the quantum state when in a computational
basis state.
If an initial mixer U(B, β0) is applied immediately fol-
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Fig. 7: 〈ψ+1 |CNash(s)|ψ+1 〉 for the asymmetric network game, using the
Quantum Alternating Operator Ansatz with p = 1 and an initially mixed
state |ψ+1 〉 = U(B, β0)|ψ1〉 generated with β0 = pi8 .
lowing the register initialization, we create a superposition of
feasible states and can then see variation on both γ and β axes
as in Fig. 7. For the initial mixing, β0 was selected as pi8 .
E. Evaluation of QAOA in solving the game
We enable the outer classical optimization loop for both the
Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm and Quantum
Alternating Operator Ansatz formulations of the problem. We
perform 10 simulated executions of each using randomly
seeded β and γ angles, and repeat for p ∈ {1, 3, 5, 8}
parameterized repetitions. We include brute force baseline
statistics, generated from a uniform distribution across all
possible, and all feasible solutions. In reporting results for
these experiments, we refer to the Quantum Approximate
Optimization Algorithm solutions to Eq. (33) and Eq. (34), and
the Quantum Alternating Operator Ansatz solutions to Eq. (35)
and Eq. (36).
Table I shows the number of experimental runs in which the
most likely state was also the optimal solution. Several trends
are evident in this table. First, increasing p tends to improve
performance, consistent with the theoretical expectation of
QAOA. Second, the Quantum Alternating Operator Ansatz
out-performed its classic counterpart, which we attribute to the
reduction in search space enacted by the parity mixers. Finally,
the optimal social solution is easier to locate for Quantum
Alternating Operator Ansatz implementation than the optimal
Nash equilibrium. For the classic variant of QAOA, the reverse
is true.
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the cumulative probability of
measurement in the space of all 64 solutions, ordered by cost
function. Both QAOA variants show a significant improvement
in results compared to random draw from the solution space,
represented by the brute force distribution. As expected, there
is a performance advantage observed for the hard constraint
formulation. In our specific experimental run, the hard con-
straint optimization found the optimal social solution for all
TABLE I: Number of simulations where the system state with the highest
probability of measurement was the optimal for the asymmetric network game.
10 simulation runs were performed in total.
Quantum Optimal Optimal
Steps Social Solution Nash Equilibrium
(p) classic ansatz classic ansatz
1 0 3 1 7
2 0 6 1 0
3 1 8 1 1
4 1 10 1 7
5 0 10 2 9
8 3 10 3 10
values of p. We do not expect this result to scale, however, as
the feasible solution space is very small, and the initial state
is a mixed state created from the computational basis state
|1〉 which happens to be the social optimal solution, and for
selected values of β may have biased the outcome.
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show the cumulative probability of
measurement in the space of the 8 feasible solutions, ordered
by cost function. These plots allow us to observe that the
Quantum Alternating Operator Ansatz out-performs random
draw even limited to the feasible solution space. Using the
hard constraint formulation, the optimal Nash equilibrium was
observed with 0% probability at p = 1, increasing to 100%
at p = 8. Using the soft constraint formulation, the optimal
result was achieved between 0.5% and 60% probability, with
the outlier at p = 5 attributed to the sensitivity of the initial
parameter setting and the use of only 10 random seeds.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we have shown the application of QAOA to
an asymmetric congestion game, solving for both the optimal
social solution and the optimal Nash equilibrium. We used
the potential function approach to solving the optimal Nash
equilibrium, which is an approach shared by recent research
into solving generative adversarial networks, and may open
new pathways to quantum assisted machine learning. We
prepared a soft constraint formulation based on the Quan-
tum Approximate Optimization Algorithm, and a hard con-
straint formulation based on the Quantum Alternating Operator
Ansatz. We undertook an initial experimental campaign on
an idealized simulator of a gate-model quantum computer to
verify our implementation and to establish tractability of the
approach.
The experimental results are not of sufficient scale to
draw conclusions regarding the performance of QAOA in
solving an asymmetric congestion game. They do however
demonstrate the tractability of the problem to be solved using
the potential function approach. This provides a valuable
framework for future work in the space of discrete games and
generative adversarial networks, where this applied research
can be combined with previous works cited in Section III-A to
address challenges of training generative adversarial networks
involving discrete variables and multi-model distributions.
Lessons learned during experimentation included the im-
portance of pre-mixing in the Quantum Alternating Operator
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Fig. 8: Cumulative probability of measurement for the asymmetric network
game for both QAOA variants and varying parameterized repetitions p, for all
possible solutions to the optimal social solution against brute force results.
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Fig. 9: Cumulative probability of measurement for the asymmetric network
game for both QAOA variants and varying parameterized repetitions p, for
all possible solutions to the optimal Nash equilibrium against brute force
results.
Ansatz when parity mixers are initialized into computational
basis states. We also uncovered the importance of randomiza-
tion of initial state in the parity mixers, which was observed
in the analysis stage to have potentially biased our results,
creating a perfect 100% probability of the optimal social
solution in some cases.
We recommend two avenues of further investigation. The
first is to deepen the development of the congestion game cre-
ated for this initial investigation. This could include tailoring
the formulation to an industrial use case, and analyzing the
computational complexity both theoretically and experimen-
tally with respect to a classical benchmark. Experimentation
should proceed through idealized simulated resources, sim-
ulated noise models and resource estimators, and validation
on current-generation NISQ hardware. The second avenue of
investigation is to apply the results of this work to training
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Fig. 10: Cumulative probability of measurement for the asymmetric network
game for both QAOA variants and varying parameterized repetitions p, for all
feasible solutions to the optimal social solution against brute force results.
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Fig. 11: Cumulative probability of measurement for the asymmetric network
game for both QAOA variants and varying parameterized repetitions p, for
all feasible solutions to the optimal Nash equilibrium against brute force
results.
of generative adversarial networks using potential function
approaches, extending current research in quantum assisted
machine learning to address industrial classification and syn-
thetic data generation problems.
VII. APPENDIX: ANALYSIS OF LIMITING BEHAVIOR OF
QUADRATIC TERMS IN THE COST FUNCTIONS
We provide the details of our analysis of the limiting be-
havior of the three principal QAOA spin-system cost functions
derived in this paper. In this analysis we simplify the spin
variable notation from si,j to s, and eliminate all constant
factors and lower-order terms in the equations.
A. Analysis of the optimal social solution
We observe in Eq. (24) and Eq. (25) that nk(s) and
dk(nk(s)) have the same form in the limit once constant
factors are removed. This allows us to expand and simplify
cost function Csocial(s) of Eq. (29) as
Csocial(s) =
∑
k∈R
nk(s) dk(nk(s))
∼
∑
k∈R
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Si|k∈j
s
2
Inside the squared term, the number of linear terms that
may result is O(np) where p ∼ |Si| is the number of paths
available to each player. Therefore by inspection the behavior
in the limit of the number of quadratic terms that may result
in Csocial(s) is O(rn2p2).
B. Analysis of the optimal Nash equilibrium
We observe in Eq. (32) that the inner summation of the
cost function for finding the optimal Nash equilibrium is of a
form that can be arranged to take advantage of the triangular
number identity
Tn =
n∑
k=1
k = 1 + 2 + 3 + · · ·+ n = n(n+ 1)
2
through the steps
CNash(s) =
∑
k∈R
nk(s)∑
j
dk(j)
=
∑
k∈R
nk(s)∑
j
(ak + bkj)
=
∑
k∈R
aknk(s) + bk nk(s)∑
j
j

=
∑
k∈R
(
aknk(s) + bkTnk(s)
)
This allows us to expand and simplify cost function CNash(s)
of Eq. (32) into a form that can be analyzed in the limit, as
CNash(s) =
∑
k∈R
(
aknk(s) + bk
nk(s)(nk(s) + 1)
2
)
∼
∑
k∈R
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Si|k∈j
s
2
This presents us with the same behavior in the limit as
the optimal social solution of Section VII-A. Therefore the
behavior in the limit of the number of quadratic terms that
may result in CNash(s) is O(rn2p2).
C. Analysis of the soft constraint penalty function
We analyze the behavior in the limit for soft constraint
penalty function designed to enforce the path selection con-
straint, Eq. (21), as
Cpath(s) = A
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Si
si,j + |Si| − 2
2
∼
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Si
s
2
Therefore the behavior in the limit of the number of
quadratic terms that may result in Cpath(s) is O(np2).
D. A note on analysis in the limit
The analysis in the limit for the two optimization functions
assumes a worst case. It does not account for the possibility of
interplay between the actual number of player paths sharing a
resource (the sum over j ∈ Si | k ∈ j), and the total number of
resources in the outer sums (the sum over k ∈ R). For specific
networks with additional topological assumptions, this worst
case may be able to be reduced.
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